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UNKNOWN GHOSTS: REASONS FOR THE CRISIS AT 
WOUNDED KNEE 
By Brijana M. Sullivan 
Dee Brown calls it a genocidal maneuver of “madness.”1 Heather 
Cox Richardson dubs it an “appalling act of racist brutality—the 
outcome of roiling partisan politics.”2 Ralph Andrist, author of The Long 
Death, labels it an operation carried out by a “mass of infuriated men 
intent only on butchery.”3 Others claim that what happened was the 
result of “injustices of a corrupt reservation system.”4 These views, 
characterizing the Indians as victims and the whites as 
“intruders...determined to destroy all that was Indian,” have vindicated 
Native responsibility at Wounded Knee as early as within hours after the 
horrific incident.5 Although these claims of white racism are defended by 
many like Brown, a contrary view persists, maintaining that the 
1 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee, New York, NY: 
Henry Holt and Company Inc, 1991, 444. 
2 Wounded Knee: Party Politics and the Road to an American 
Massacre book review, Publishers Weekly online: April 26, 2010, 
https://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-465-00921-3. 
3 Gerald Vizenor, "Genocide Tribunals," In Native Liberty: Natural 
Reason and Cultural Survivance, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2009, 147, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn41k.10. 
4 Karl Jacoby, "Of Memory and Massacre: A Soldier's Firsthand 
Account of the ‘Affair on Wounded Knee,’" The Princeton University Library 
Chronicle 64, no. 2 (2003): 340, 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.25290/prinunivlibrchro.64.2.0333. 
5 William Lee Adams, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, Time 
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bloodbath at Wounded Knee was not intentional but was, rather, a 
horrific accident.  
Supporters of this second view demonstrate that the incident at 
Wounded Knee was neither a battle nor a massacre, but was, instead, a 
culmination of desperation and panic resulting from an era entrenched in 
suspicion and uneasiness. This position, advocated by historians such as 
Robert Utley and Jerome Greene, is consistent with recent academic 
studies and maintains that the consequences of the increased fear within 
both Native and white communities produced one of the bloodiest 
conflicts of Native American history. In short, these studies agree that 
what happened was an indirect result of fear and mistrust instilled more 
than a century earlier.  
The climatic event in 1890 can be traced back to the early 18th 
century to a time when the concept of a “reservation” was first used. 
According to historian Stuart Banner, a reservation originally referred to 
a parcel of land that a person wished to retain.6 However, by the time 
Lewis and Clark blazed a trail from ocean to ocean and the Oregon Trail 
frenzy slackened, the definition of “reservation” had changed 
dramatically. In fact, by the middle of the 19th century, a “reservation” 
meant nothing more than a piece of “land the government had selected 
from its own land and reserved for the Indians’ use.”7 That is, land 
originally occupied by Indians was ultimately purchased by the 
American Government and set aside for later generations of the same 
tribes. However, these later generations were not the only ones 
contending for the land. 
The nomadic lifestyle of the Plains Indians had been disrupted 
by the rooted lifestyle of the white settler who replaced forests with 
6 Stuart Banner, "Reservations," In How the Indians Lost Their Land: 
Law and Power on the Frontier, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2005,229,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9vqr.10. 
7 Banner, 230. 
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farmland, prairies with pastures, and campsites with cabin settlements. 
Thus, in order to foster a unified culture that would help prevent clashes 
between settlers and Natives, the government decided to create a 
navigable course toward assimilation for the Indians8 Historian Alex 
Ruuska explains that assimilation began with the introduction of 
subsistence farming, since permanence was at the core of white culture. 
Subsistence farming was a lifestyle that did not allow for mobility of9 An 
excellent example of how the government envisioned assimilation 
through subsistence farming is seen in the story of the Horn Clouds. 
The Horn Clouds, a Miniconjou Sioux family, had returned to 
the Dakota region from Canada in the 1880’s and had come to terms with 
“an unavoidable truth: the old way of life was over.”10 Realizing this 
truth allowed them to put aside the traditional nomadic lifestyle and 
settle permanently. In fact, it was not long before their property soon 
morphed into a large and thriving ranch on which they raised cattle and 
horses.11 Unfortunately, most Sioux were not like the Horn Clouds and 
rejected assimilation entirely.  
The Native rejection of assimilation took on many forms in 
addition to intense disinterest in an agrarian lifestyle. For example, 
Paiute and Lakota Sioux attacks on railroad stations and livestock were 
not uncommon occurrences in the West during the middle decades of the 
20th century.12 Eventually, the federal government, determined to keep 
8 Mark Palmer and Robert Rundstrom, "GIS, Internal Colonialism, and 
the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 103, no. 5 (2013): 1144, www.jstor.org/stable/23485658. 
9Alex Ruuska, "Ghost Dancing and the Iron Horse: Surviving through 
Tradition and Technology," In Technology and Culture 52, no. 3, 2011, 585. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23020646. Ruuska, 585. 
10 Philip Burnham, Song of Dewey Beard: Last Survivor of the Little 
Bighorn, 58, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d9nmz7.11. 
11 Burnham, 58. 
12 Ruuska, 586. 
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the Natives from interfering with the land of the whites and vice versa, 
debated three potential solutions to quell conflict between the Indians 
and white settlers.  
The first option required police action along the vast expanse of 
Indian country in the West.  A second would compel the government to 
completely terminate white emigration.13 As these first two courses of 
action were neither feasible nor practical, a third option involving the use 
of reservations was adopted. 
The system of reservations began when Natives and whites, who 
both desired to avoid territorial disputes, began furiously signing 
numerous land agreements and treaties. Simply put, these agreements 
promised that each would stay off the other’s land. Unfortunately, it was 
not long before the failure of both sides to keep their promises caused 
reservations to become sites of contention and struggle, particularly 
during the latter decades of the 19th century. Perhaps the most infamous 
struggle emerged with the establishment of the Great Sioux Reservation 
in the Dakota territory—the birthplace of the Sioux people and the land 
of their ancestral ghosts. 14 
Before the ink dried on the initial agreement, the area was 
inadvertently downsized by Sioux signatures penned in confidence that 
the federal promises of compensation in the form of cows, horses, plows, 
or schools would be fulfilled.15 By 1889, the government’s failure to 
deliver full recompense soon left many, including the Horn Clouds, with 
the worst scenario imaginable: a starving population in the midst of a 
merciless winter. In fact, according to historian Greene, one local 
newspaper reported that “cattle that reached Pine Ridge were, ‘better 
13 Banner, 231. 
14 The Lakota Emergence Story, 
https://www.nps.gov/wica/learn/historyculture/the-lakota-emergence-story.htm. 
15 Burnham, 59. 
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subjects for the taxidermist than the butcher.’”16 Not surprisingly, 
desperation soon set in.  
As is common in spans of desperation and starvation, religion 
presented itself as an appealing cure from the societal wretchedness 
permeating the Indian community, and revival was imminent. In the mid-
1800s, fear that white expansion would only bring death inspired a Paiute 
prophet from Fish Lake, Nevada, to have a vision and preach a doctrine 
of ritual dancing that would return the Indians to their old way of life.17 
Less than 20 years later, the entrancing messages delivered by self-
proclaimed Paiute prophet Wovoka caused the dance of deliverance to 
the old way of life to spread throughout the Great Basin tribes. By 1890, 
this pan-Indian movement known as the “Ghost Dance” was popularized 
at Pine Ridge, the Lakota Sioux reservation in South Dakota. 
In an interview conducted in 1891 with the Los Angeles Herald, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas Morgan stated that he believed 
the dance originated in response to Congress’ reductions of 
“appropriations for the Sioux and other tribes” as well as crop failure.18 
However, modern historian, L.G. Moses, records that the motivations to 
start dancing comprised a much longer list: “Broken treaties, land 
encroachment, depletion of game, and assimilationist programs of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs had demoralized the tribes to such an extent that 
they awaited deliverance from their depression and sorrow.”19 Regardless 
of its impetus, former chief historian of the National Park Service Robert 
16 Jerome Greene, American Carnage: Wounded Knee, 1890, 56, 
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014.  
17 Ruuska, 579. 
18 Los Angeles Herald 06 Jan. 1891, In Chronicling America: Historic 
American Newspapers, Lib. of Congress, 
<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84025968/1891-01-06/ed-1/seq-1/> 
Los Angeles herald (pdf). 
19 L. G. Moses, ""The Father Tells Me So!" Wovoka: The Ghost Dance 
Prophet," American Indian Quarterly 9, no. 3, (1985): 335. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1183834. 
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Utley ascertained that the object of the Dance was to restore “the old 
savage life and its dominant values.”20 
According to ethnomusicologist Judith Vander, dances took 
place during four successive nights, once every six weeks and its 
variations were contingent on the region in which it was propagated.21 
That is, dances in the Great Basin tended to revolve around growth, 
nature, and the celebration new life, whereas, for tribes like the Sious on 
the Plains, dances focused “on a way of life: games, gambling, hunting 
buffalo, bow and arrows, and tepees, all harking back to the old nomadic 
Plains life...”22 As the craving for cultural return to the good old days 
was strongest in the Great Plains, it was in this latter region where 
perversion of Wovoka’s prophecies materialized. Participants in 
Wovoka's Ghost Dance were promised a return to the old way of 
living—the hunting of the bison on the wide plains—as well as the 
reunification of the living with the dead. Journalist Philip Burnham 
wrote, “It’s no surprise that many Lakota chose to dance...The old ways 
were doomed, the new ones unproven. The dance was the only thing left 
that recalled the world of their elders.”23 
A Ghost Dance was typically preceded by a twenty-four hour 
fast followed by a traditional sweat bath. Preparation continued as men 
and women dawned “ghost” shirts or dresses painted red with eagles, sun 
circles, and thunderbirds. Metal and products produced by whites were 
prohibited.24 The basic methodology of the dance is as follows:  
20 Utley, 70. 
21 Judith Vander, "The Creative Power and Style of Ghost Dance 
Songs," In Music of the First Nations: Tradition and Innovation in Native North 
America, edited by Tara Browner, 113, University of Illinois Press, 2009, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/j.ctt1xcmmt.10. 
22 Vander, 117. 
23 Burnham, 64. 
24 Burnham, 62. 
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“The dancers would lock hands in a circle around [a] tree, 
shuffling in the dirt, moving right to left. As they danced and 
sang, they sought a vision of their relatives in the other world. 
They used no drums. The dancing was ecstatic and lasted four 
days and nights, many dancers dropping to the ground when the 
spirit— or sheer exhaustion— overcame them. The falling were 
dragged along by the others until they couldn’t go on, and most 
would faint away, later to rise and recount their visions. When 
they finished one dance, they would get up and start again.”25 
For the faction of Dancers who wanted peace, the Ghost Dance 
was nothing more than a religious appeal for new life. However, for 
some, it represented much more. Although Wovoka’s doctrine advocated 
non-violence, some, including the Sioux, did not share this sentiment. In 
fact, embittered by the land agreements and demoralized by the ration 
cuts, this faction harbored intense hatred toward the white man in a 
shared mindset that Utley asserted was “indeed explosive.”26 For these 
Indians, the Dance symbolized their resistance to assimilation and 
condoned their propensity to use Wovoka’s doctrine as justification to 
declare holy war on the white settlers.27 
For many whites, the prospect of a holy war emerging from the 
Ghost Dance was improbable. In fact, settlers near Dance sites tended to 
harbor more curiosity for it rather than fear. However, in early winter, as 
reports of violence were perpetuated throughout the region near Pine 
Ridge, many began to reevaluate the potential danger implicated by the 
Dance. 
On December 7, 1890, as Greene records, a “foraging group of 
young warriors from the Ghost Dance camp on White River exchanged 
gunfire with ranchers...along the Cheyenne River west of Pine Ridge 
25 Burnham, 63. 
26 Utley, 87. 
27 Utley, 72. 
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Reservation.” Following this episode, nearby settlers started to abandon 
their homes.28 Other potential danger was implicated by the weakness of 
the Indian Bureau which, as historian Jeffery Ostler writes, “probably 
encouraged resistance by increasing the likelihood for its assertation.”29 
Whether or not this was true, it was not long before Congress decided 
that military intervention on reservations was necessary if peaceful 
assimilation was to be attained.30 
Of course, multiple factors complicated the decisions of 
Congress to send in the army, not the least of which was a report made 
by Special Agent Lea who reported in November of 1890 that the Indians 
planned to go “on a big hunt as soon as grass [came] next spring, and that 
[meant] warpath.”31  Other complications included the exaggerated 
reports made by newspapers describing the likelihood of a violent 
uprising and “terrifying the local populace into believing their property 
and lives were at stake.”32 Additionally, Congress received reports such 
as one made by John Reynolds, who assumed command of Pine Ridge in 
October of 1890, and called for “‘a sufficient force of troops’ be sent” 
due to information that the Indians were trading horses for weapons.33 
Eventually, despite fears such as those articulated by one Bureau 
employee, Agent McLaughlin, that military intervention “would only 
28 Greene, 161. 
29 Ostler, 242. 
30 Ostler, 241. 
31 Rani-Henrik Andersson, "Wanáği Wachípi Kį," In The Lakota Ghost 
Dance of 1890, 199, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn575.7. 
32 Charles Herbert Cressey, Sting of the Bee: A Day-By-Day Account of 
Wounded Knee and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890-1891 as recorded in the Omaha 
Bee, introduction and notes by Samuel L. Russell, Carlisle, PA: Russell Martial 
Research, 2016, introduction xx. 
33 Ostler, 226. 
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lead to bloodshed,” Congress—that is, not the army officials in 
Washington, D.C.—opted to send in the armed forces.34 
At first, as Greene points out, the army was ordered to “to 
remove designated Indian leaders that the federal government believed 
[were] instrumental in promoting the [Ghost Dance] movement.”35 This 
meant that potential targets included men such as Hump of the Cheyenne 
and Sitting Bull of the Hunkpapas. Unfortunately, despite Congress’s 
best intentions, it soon became evident that military intervention would 
not always produce its desired result of firm, yet peaceful, intervention. 
Indeed, it was not long before Agent McLaughlin‘s fears were realized. 
Since the beginning of the Ghost Dance crisis, no significant 
bloodletting occurred until December 15, 1890, during the capture of 
Sitting Bull at his cabin 40 miles southwest of Pine Ridge Agency.36 
Initially, Sitting Bull agreed to go peacefully with the Indian police, but 
his arrest was interrupted with the shouts of his 14-year-old son who, as 
Greene disclosed, “began chiding his father for permitting himself to be 
carried away in such a manner, calling him a ‘fool’ and ‘crazy.’”37 This 
outburst led to a brief skirmish which ended in deaths on both sides, 
including that of Sitting Bull. 
The deaths at Sitting Bull’s cabin increased tensions and the 
potential for more violence. Not long after the altercation near Grand 
River, nearly 400 of Sitting Bull’s followers were reported to have fled 
the agency. Agent McLaughlin, fearing potential escalation if the Indians 
joined forces with either Kicking Bear and Short Bull in the Stronghold 
or the Miniconjous along Cheyenne River, quickly sent out emissaries to 
persuade the fugitives to return to the agency.38 Although most of the 
Miniconjou returned to their homes, a few sought refuge with Big Foot, a 
34 Andersson, 114. 
35 Greene, 167. 
36 Greene, 188. 
37 Greene, 181. 
38 Utley, 169. 
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Miniconjou Sioux chief, on Cheyenne River.39 Because he was harboring 
Sitting Bull’s people, who were well-known Ghost Dancers, it was not 
long before Big Foot, like Sitting Bull, would become a target for Indian 
police. 40 
The rumors that implicated Big Foot as a threat were not true. In 
fact, some, like Colonel Sumner, believed Big Foot was “the best 
instrument for keeping the peace” in the days following Sitting Bull’s 
death.41 Unfortunately, due to various instances of miscommunication 
within the army as well as the understanding that Big Foot was harboring 
Standing Rock fugitives whom the army believed to be hostile, it was not 
long before Colonel Sumner was given orders to intercept the chief and 
take him, along with his people, to the agency at Camp Cheyenne.42 
There, he would be arrested.  
Although Big Foot had agreed to travel with Sumner to Camp 
Cheyenne, his people were not so willing. In fact, a few days after the 
chief's agreement, Colonel Sumner received a report that Big Foot was 
being taken by his band on to Pine Ridge Agency against his will.43 In 
Greene’s opinion, the Miniconjou reasoning for doing this had to do with 
the military’s advancement up the Cheyenne River and a “report that the 
Standing Rock Indians at Bennett been disarmed.”44 Though not hostile 
in intent, this spontaneous Miniconjou movement proved to have 
disastrous results. 
As the army was not far behind, scholar Rani-Henrik Andersson 
records that, “instead of trying to avoid them, [Big Foot] decided to meet 
them openly” and slowed his band long enough for the army to catch up 
39 Greene, 196. 
40 Utley, 174. 
41 Utley, 181. 
42 Greene, 197. 
43 Utley, 185. 
44 Greene, 201. 
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to them.45 Only a few days after their flight, Major Whitside overtook the 
little band near Wounded Knee creek on December 28, 1890. According 
to one soldier, “After a short conference Big-Foot surrendered his band, 
declared his heart was good, and that he loved the pale-faces.”46 Clearly, 
the Miniconjou leader did not anticipate trouble.  
The night of December 28th was frigid, and as darkness fell, the 
army set up tents for those Miniconjou who were short on tepees. 
However, as many of the Miniconjou remained suspicious of the army’s 
intentions, these tents were readily refused.47 Big Foot and his wife, 
however, were more accepting of the army’s accommodations and 
welcomed Whitside’s offer to stay in their own private quarters. As Big 
Foot was suffering from a severe case of pneumonia, an assistant army 
surgeon, James D. Glennan, oversaw his treatment.48  
Sometime later that evening, Colonel Forsyth arrived at the 
camp. Forsyth retained a carefree, even cheerful, attitude despite 
troublesome orders to disarm the Miniconjou and send them to the 
railroad for transportation to Omaha,.49 Charles Allen, a reporter who 
spent a good part of the evening with Forsyth, recorded how he was 
“unforgettably entertained with a graphic account of many incidents in 
[Forsyth’s] European tour...after the Civil War.”50 
Disarmament began early the next morning and was announced 
by Philip Wells, a mixed-blood army interpreter.51 Unfortunately, the 
45 Andersson, 90. 
46 Samuel L Russell, "Lieut. J. C. Gresham’s Account of Wounded 
Knee,” Army at Wounded Knee, Carlisle, PA: Russell Martial Research, 2015-
2016,  https://armyatwoundedknee.com/2013/08/13/lieut-j-c-greshams-account-
of-wounded-knee/. 
47 Greene, 214. 
48 Greene, 214. 
49 Utley, 204. 
50 Greene, 219. 
51 Burnham, 72. 
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Indian warrior’s initial refusal to give up their arms combined with the 
army‘s increasing anxiety—due to the rather loud and rattling presence 
of the medicine man Yellow Bird who was “scooping handfuls of earth 
and tossing them skyward like the Ghost Dancers” —gave rise to 
tensions that soon permeated the whole of the gathering.52 Eventually, 
army Captains Varnum and Wallace, sensing the tension, told their men 
to “hit the ground” and fire from prone positions if shooting erupted.53 
Despite the strained atmosphere, the morning passed with little incident. 
However, as the sun rose higher in the sky, the medicine man grew more 
agitated, and it was not long before pandemonium hit the scene out of 
nowhere. Despite their orders, some white troops never had the chance to 
“hit the ground.” 
As some recalled later, Yellow Bird threw a handful of dirt 
skyward and “[let loose] on a high- shrieking eagle-bone whistle,” 
sparking a commotion which caused Captain Varum to yell, “Look 
out...they’ve broken!”54 The next second, a single gunshot was fired. 
Burnham suggests that this was possibly shot by Black Coyote, a deaf 
Lakota who had not heard the order from Big Foot to surrender.55 Private 
Spotted Horse recalled that the first shot was fired by a gun that suddenly 
went off while it was wrestled over by a soldier and Yellow Bird Private 
Spotted Horse recalled56￼ Regardless of where the first shot came from, 
the air was immediately full of bullets.  
One reporter recorded that, “In a moment the whole front was a 
sheet of fire above which the smoke rolled, obscuring the central scene 
from view.”57 A Civil War veteran nicknamed “Old Hickory” recounted, 
“‘For ten or fifteen minutes it was as heavy fire as I have ever 
52 Burnham, 73. 
53 Greene, 228. 
54 Greene, 228. 
55 Burnham, 73. 
56 Greene, 275. 
57 Greene, 229. 
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experienced.’”58 In fact, it was soon clear that two fronts were not 
distinguishable and the shooting was coming from all directions.
As smoke filled the air, it became harder to see. An artilleryman 
on the hill above the camp reported that firing from above was difficult 
because the troops below were intermingled and not “clear from amidst 
the Indians.’”59 Horn Cloud, the sixteen-year-old chief of the 
Miniconjous, reported that the scene was incredibly reckless because the 
army was shooting at each other.60 Other reports were similar including 
that given by Lieutenant Preston who, a few days after the battle, 
recounted in a letter to his brother that, “It was clear that we had been 
killing each other.”61  
As it became evident that women and children were among the 
dead, Forsythe yelled, “‘Quit shooting at them[!]’”62 As First Lieutenant 
John C. Gresham recalled, “‘Don’t hurt the squaws and children,’ was 
the general cry over the field.”63 Later, one soldier who interviewed with 
the Los Angeles Herald, recalled that “It [was] impossible to say...in an 
Indian skirmish [when to] stop firing long enough to find out just what 
sort of Indian you are shooting at. Women and men look very much alike 
in their blanket costume, and the former are quite as fierce fighters as the 
men.”64 The painful realization that the army had been shooting each 
other as well as innocent women and children stung more than the icy 
morning air.  
As guns fell silent, one survivor, the interpreter Wells, came 
across a wounded warrior who pointed a closed fist and shot out his 
fingers—a deadly insult—toward the dead medicine man on the ground. 
58 Greene, 273. 
59 Greene, 234. 
60 Greene, 273. 
61 Greene, 231. 
62 Greene, 241. 
63 Russel, Gresham’s Account. 
64 Los Angeles Herald. 
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As Wells recalled, the warrior, “speaking as though to the dead man: ‘If I 
could be taken to you I would stab you!’” 65 He then proceeded to call 
the medicine man ‘our murderer.’ A similar account involving Big 
Foot’s brother, Frog, explained that the Miniconjou made a sign of 
“‘most bitter hatred and contempt’” over the body of Yellow Bird.66 Both 
these actions suggested that the dead Ghost Dancer, who had a 
premonition for battle, contributed to the initiation of hostilities.  
As the news of what happened spread across the country, the 
Department of Indian Affairs sent a letter to the Department of the 
Interior “giving the opinion that a relief fund should be furnished by 
Congress so as to enable the department to assist all Indians who require 
aid [that] winter, not only with food but also in the purchase of seeds and 
other articles required for planting...and to grant immediate assistance 
when required.”67 This was not genocidal language. Those who knew the 
horror of what had happened were determined to expunge any potential 
replay of events. 
In the end, although neither side was to blame, both parties at 
Wounded Knee were responsible. While racism and hatred for the other 
side was not the primary factor that spurred both to fight, it was 
undoubtedly harbored in the minds of many who were present. The 
incident at Wounded Knee was not a battle or a massacre but rather an 
accident veiled in misunderstanding and resulting in a flurry of panicked 
reactions on both sides. As few particulars of the crisis are known, the 
arguments made by scholars like Greene, Utley, and Burnham agree that 
it is impossible to determine where the true blame lies. In fact, it appears 
that most accounts only agree on two particulars: the unknown origin of 
the first shot and its horrible, yet avoidable, consequences.  
On January 22, 1891, the Washington Evening Star printed a 
haunting summary of historian Walter Camp’s interpretation of the 
65 Greene, 242. 
66 Greene, 274. 
67 Los Angeles Herald. 
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events at Wounded Knee. Camp’s conclusion, a recollection of the 
Wests’ tumultuous past of desperation, fear, and mistrust, suggested that 
other forms of ghosts had entered the scene long before those implicated 
in the Ghost Dances were recognized. As Camp claimed, although “it 
was the Indians who were doing the dancing it was really the whites who 
saw the ghosts.”68 Surely, this was the truth behind the era‘s horrific 
climax at Wounded Knee.  
This photograph, taken by the Northwestern Photography Company (marked as 
public domain), depicts U.S. soldiers burying dead Lakota warriors in a common 
grave at Wounded Knee, South Dakota following the Battle of Wounded Knee 
in 1891.
68 Greene, 380. 
